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Virtue, Obligationand Politics
STEPHEN

G.

SALKEVER

Bryn Mawr College

Recently, several students of moral philosophy have pointed out that even our most selfconsciously philosophical understanding of
morality and ethics is strongly conditioned by
the concepts we use in discussing moral and
ethical questions. It has been suggested by
Anscombe,' Cunningham,2 Frankena,' and
Hampshire,4 that the conclusions we draw concerning the answers to ethical questions depend
heavily upon the concepts and categories we
use in posing and interpreting those questions.
One example of this kind of difference between various conceptions of morality is developed in Frankena's discussion of the distinction between an ethics of virtue and an ethics
of obligation:5 our answer to the basic ethical
question, What ought I do? will change as our
interpretation of that question changes from
What is the virtuous thing to do? to What am
I obligated to do? Our subsequent ethical
theory, it is suggested, will depend upon the
way in which we interpret the "ought" of the
basic question, whether in terms of "virtue"
(or "way of life") or in terms of "obligation."'
If this is so, then one important task of con1 G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy,"
reprinted in The Is-Ought Question, ed. William D.
Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 175-195.
2 Stanley
B. Cunningham, "Does 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest upon a Mistake' Make an Even Greater
Mistake?," Monist, 54 (January, 1970), 86-99.
K. Frankena, "Prichard and the Ethics
3William
of Virtue," Monist, 54 (January, 1970), 1-17. Both
Cunningham and Frankena take as their point of
departure H. A. Prichard's paradigm-setting
essay,
"Does Moral Philosophy Rest upon a Mistake?," reprinted in Prichard, Moral Obligation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 1-17.
4Stuart
Hampshire, "A New Philosophy
of the
Just Society," New York Review of Books, February
24, 1972, pp. 34-39. Hampshire's article is an extended review of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).
Both Hampshire
and Marshall
Cohen (in his review of Rawls's book in The New
York Times Book Review, July 16, 1972, p. 1)
praise Rawls's study; but both, and especially Hampshire, have reservations about the value of Rawls's
political theory, reservations which are based on their
feeling that Rawls has not sufficiently explored the
possibilities of what I will be calling the language
of virtue in political philosophy.
See Hampshire,
p. 38, and Cohen, p. 18.
5Frankena
argues that "moral philosophy
must
fully explore the possibility of a satisfactory ethics
of virtue as an alternative or supplement to one of
obligation . . . ,"
("Prichard and the Ethics of
Virtue," p. 17).

temporary moral philosophy becomes the clarification of significant differences between various characteristic ways of conceptualizing the
basic ethical question. This project of clarification can have at least two important results:
first, it can help us avoid confusion in the
process of comparing various ethical theories;
and second, we may be able to develop arguments to suggest that one or another ethical
language is best equipped to deal with the
broadest possible range of substantive ethical
questions.
In this paper I am going to suggest that this
particular project of clarification is as important for students of politics and political philosophy as it is for students of ethics and
moral philosophy.6 In particular, I want to direct attention to two basic ways of interpreting
or understanding the meaning of politics as an
activity: politics conceived as a problem of
moral and intellectual virtue, and politics conceived as a problem of obligation and legitimacy. While these two are surely not the only
ways of thinking and speaking about politics,
it may be fair to say that, leaving theological
conceptions aside, the politics of virtue and
the politics of obligation and legitimacy are the
two alternative political languages presented to
us most clearly by the history of political
thought.
Politics and Virtue
Now the conjunction of "politics" and the
problem of "moral and intellectual virtue" is
not an ordinary or familiar one. especially to
twentieth-century students of politics and political philosophy; indeed, one concern of this
paper will be to explain why this pairing may
appear to us to be not merely odd, but absurd.
At any rate, I think it will be easily admitted
that when we think about what constitutes the
political, about what distinguishes the political
relationship from other kinds of human relationships, such as love or war or trade or
scholarship, we are not likely to regard the
6 The distinction between ethics (or morality) and
politics is itself the result of a particular way of
understanding both ethics and politics. In my terms,
the distinction is much more appropriate and important to politics conceived in terms of obligation
(for which ethics tends to become the residual class
of all nonobligatory "duties"), than to politics conceived in terms of virtue or ways of life.
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distinction between moral and intellectual virtue as being of critical relevance. Instead, I
think it is fair to say that for the central
tendencies of modern political philosophy, the
basic political question is not about virtue of
any sort, but rather about the reconciliation of
the requirements (needs and desires) of the
individual and the requirements of society as a
whole. In other words, the modern answer to
the question, What is politics? is characteristically dependent upon our answer to the
question of political obligation, Why should I
obey the law? Politics thus becomes that activity that occurs within the sphere constituted
by legitimate authority.7 Although it may be
excessively simple, I do not think it grossly
distorting to say that for modern political
thought the fundamental and defining political
distinction is not between intellectual (and
nonpolitical) and moral (or political) virtue,
but between two forms of social control:
power (which is nonpolitical) and authority
(which is political).8 These distinctions are intended only as a description of what I take to
be the major tendency in modern political
thought. I am not suggesting that there is necessarily any logical incompatibility between politics understood in terms of virtue and politics
understood in terms of obligation; rather, the
distinction points to a difference in emphasis.9
Perhaps the best-known brief statement of
this aspect of the modern view concerning the
foundations of politics is Rousseau's: "Man is
born free, and everywhere he is in chains . . .
How did this change happen? I do not know.
What can make it legitimate? I think I can
resolve that question."'0 Rousseau's political
philosophy, like most serious political thought
I Throughout
this paper I will refer to "contemporary political philosophy" as if there were one
single position or school that could be identified in
this way. This is surely an oversimplification, but I
think such an identification is plausible, as well as
useful for the purposes of my argument. For examples of this position, consider Concepts in Social
and Political Philosophy, ed. Richard E. Flathman
(New York: Macmillan, 1973); Political Philosophy,
ed. Anthony Quinton (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967); and David Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (New York: Praeger, 1970). There
are undeniably some notable nonconforming summary conceptions of the tasks of political philosophy,
such as that of George Kateb, Political Theory (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 3.
'A different and more complex formulation of the
distinction between power and authority is presented
by Hannah Arendt in On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1970), pp. 44-45.
'See Below, p. 90. For a similar characterization,
see J. Peter Euben, "Walzer's Obligations," Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1 (Summer, 1972), 438-459.
10 Social Contract, book I, chapter 1, in JeanJacques Rousseau, Oeuvres Completes, Bernard Gag-
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from the seventeenth century down to the present time, takes as its theme the question of why
free individuals should obey the law of society,
if they were not in fact compelled to do so.
If no plausible answer can be given to this
question, then civil or legal authority as we
know it is merely a mask for power, and
politics is nothing more than a disguised or
sublimated version of war or incarceration."'
On this view, the problem of political philosophy becomes that of defining the difference between the political relationship and the conditions that obtain on battlefields and in prisons.
All of this, on the surface at least, is very remote from the question of moral and intellectual virtue. The preoccupation of that political philosophy which develops around the
question of political obligation seems to be with
the difference between politics and slavery,
rather than the difference between politics and
nebin and Marcel Raymond, eds. (Paris: Bibliotheque
de la P16iade, Editions Gallimard, 1959-), III, 351.
Cf. Social Contract (First Version), book I, chapter
3, O.C. III, 289: "Man is born free, and nevertheless
he is everywhere in chains" (emphasis added). Speaking of the paradigmatic character of this passage,
John Carnes makes the following comment:
"This
paragraph . . . might be taken as the motto, not
only of social contract theory, but of the whole of
political theory." "Myths, Bliks, and the Social Contract," Journal of Value Inquiry, 4 (Summer, 1970),
105-118, at 114.
"' Or, less dramatically,
of the marketplace. The
view that the disappearance of politics is a necessary
consequence of the fundamental premises of modern
moral and political philosophy is stated in a plausible
manner by R. P. Wolff: "If all men have a continuing obligation to achieve the highest degree of
autonomy possible, then there would appear to be
no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to
obey its commands. Hence, the concept of a de jure
legitimate state would appear to be vacuous, and
philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only
reasonable political belief for an enlightened man."
In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper and
Row, 1970), p. 19. See also Wolff, "On Violence,"
Journal of Philosophy, 66 (October 2, 1969), 601616. The less than plausible aspect of Wolff's argument is that once he has shown that the political
problem can not be solved in terms of the language
of obligation and legitimacy, he concludes that the
problem is simply insoluble. This conclusion neglects
the possibility, that the problem might be solvable
in some other terms, or (as I shall try to show) that
the problem itself is the result of certain prior philosophical presuppositions,
and hence is only one possible philosophical conception of politics among several, all of which must be considered before we say
that political philosophy as such secretes philosophical anarchism. An interesting discussion of the relationship between descriptive conceptions of politics
and normative political rules is provided by Charles
Taylor, "Neutrality in Political Science," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, 3rd series, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (New York: Barnes and
Noble, 1967), pp. 25-57.
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philosophy."1 It is by no means obvious that
anything is intrinsically wrong with this lowering of the horizon of political philosophy. I
will try to suggest, however, that the most
important types of theory that characteristically
result from an obligation conception of politics
may be unsound insofar as they are unable to
give an adequate account of some important
political phenomena that can better be discussed in terms of moral and intellectual virtue.
The discussion of politics by way of the
question of moral and intellectual virtue is a
procedure followed not by Rousseau (at least,
not in the Social Contract), but by ancient
political philosophy. In the political works of
Plato and Aristotle, the question of legitimate
authority appears to be subordinate to the question, How ought human beings to live? or,
What is the best life for man?'3 Plato and
Aristotle both seem to suggest that before it is
possible to consider the question of legitimate
authority, it is necessary to consider why anyone should choose to enter a political relationship in the first place. We enter into an economic relationship, for example, in signing a
contract for the sale or purchase of some
product, because by doing so we can expect to
obtain something we desire. But what analogous
but distinct value can be obtained from choosing to become a citizen? The answer to this
question is surely difficult and complex, but at
least we might begin by saying that any such
answer would depend upon the answer to yet
another question, namely, What kinds of things
are good for human beings? That is to say, the
problem of defining the political as distinct
from (for example) the economic has something to do with the problem of distinguishing
the public good from the private goods of individuals. The definition of the political involves the movement from the private to the
public, and from the private to the public perspective on the question, What is desirable?
Now, in order to give a perfectly adequate ac12 1
do not mean to suggest that these /two
concerns are necessarily mutually exclusive, although a
concentration on one of these distinctions might well
require an abstraction from the other (since each
distinction tends to appear insignificant when viewed
from the perspective of the other). Consider, for
example, Aristotle's abstraction from (or at the very
least, obscuring of) intellectual virtue when he presents the grounds for distinguishing between slaves
and free men (citizens)
in Politics 1. 5. 1259b221260a34.
13 See
Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago:
Rand McNally, Inc., 1964), chapters 1 and 2. For
Rawls, and for modern political thought in general,
this question can not be rationally answered. See
A Theory of Justice, section 50.
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count of the public good, it is necessary to say
something about the good of that most inclusive of all publics, the human species. Of
course, in order to understand what the human
good is, it is necessary to understand what the
human, as such, is. In this way, it seems that
there is a direct path from the political question to the human question, since we can fully
answer the question of whether or how political
life is choiceworthy only on the basis of an
understanding of what human beings are-an
understanding, that is to say, of human nature.'4

For example, suppose we were to assert that
the central or defining characteristic of human
activity is the attempt to maximize (privately
defined) pleasure or to minimize (privately defined) pain or both.'5 Human beings could
then have nothing in common but the common
pursuit of individually determined goals. The
political life, then, distinguished by a concern
for the common or public good, would be
worth following only if it proved to be instrumental or useful in terms of our nonpolitical
(for instance, economic) goals. Of course, some
people might simply find their private happiness in public life, but given this understanding of human nature, there can be no common
or communicable reason for choosing politics
for its own sake.16 On the other hand, if it
"I Anscombe's
criticism of the ethics of obligation
rests in part on the argument that an adequate
moral philosophy is impossible without an adequate
philosophical psychology; that is, it is impossible to
say what a good action is until we are clear about
"what a human action is at all." "Modern Moral
Philosophy,"
p. 179. Stuart Hampshire argues that
any idea of human goodness depends on some idea
of "the distinctive powers of humanity." Thought
and Action (New York: The Viking Press, 1967),
chapter 4. Stephen Clark discusses and defends the
Aristotelian
argument from "distinctive powers" to
moral principle in "The Use of 'Man's Function' in
Aristotle," Ethics, 82 (July, 1972), 269-283.
15 This is the basis of John Stuart Mill's proof of the
utility principle in Utilitarianism, chapter 4. The difficulty here is that in this view of human action,
rational interpersonal
comparison
becomes
impossible. Rawls (p. 174) attempts to overcome this difficulty by specifying the existence of certain objective "primary social goods, things that every rational
person is presumed to want whatever else he wants."
A critical account of Rawls's attempt is given by
Adina Schwartz,
"Moral Neutrality
and Primary
Goods," Ethics, 83 (July, 1973), 294-307.
6 This view is suggested by, among others, Hobbes:
"The passions that incline men to peace, are fear
of death; desire of such things as are necessary to
commodious living; and a hope by their industry to
obtain them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn into
agreement." Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell's
Political
Texts, Basil Blackwell,
1946), chapter 13, p. 84. The classical criticism of
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were presupposed that human life activity is
constituted or defined by the possibility of
creating and obeying nonpersonal (or nonsubjective) public standards or goals, then it might
reasonably be argued that political life is always
choiceworthy so long as it is not only an instrument of private gain, and regardless of
what particular public goal stands at the center
of the political order.'7
The procedure by which a discussion of the
meaning of politics is linked to a discussion of
moral and intellectual virtue by way of a consideration of the question of human nature, is
followed explicitly by Plato and Aristotle; a
brief summary of this procedure may be useful
to show one way in which virtue and politics
may be thought of as interdependent. Now
although Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics, for example, differ in many important respects, both works conceive human activity as
being fundamentally threefold. Like other animals, human beings have a capacity for growth
and a desire to promote that growth. We eat,
drink, mate, and experience the pleasures and
pains connected with these and similar movements. This range of experience is said to be
private or nonpolitical in the sense that these
activities and feelings would always occur,
whether there were such things as politics (or
publics) or not. This is not to say that survival and growth are politically irrelevant; however, ancient political philosophy as a whole
appears to contend that if this were all there
were to human life there would be no such
thing as politics, strictly speaking. In fact, since
these activities are in no way peculiar to the
beings we call human, since they are common
to many animals, it would be reasonable to say
that if these activities were descriptive of the
entire range of human activities there would be
this conception of politics as an alliance for the purpose of avoiding death is presented by Aristotle,
Politics, 3. 5. 1280a25-1281a9. According to Aristotle, such an alliance is a necessary precondition of
politics, but is not itself political.
17 This conception of human nature and politics is
drawn from some modern writers who might be
called existentialist or historicist, such as F. Nietzsche,
Beyond Good and Evil, Section 188; Ortega y Gasset,
Revolt of the Masses, chapter 13 (beginning). JeanPaul Sartre's contention that man defines himself by
his "project" seems to be in line with this development; see Search For a Method, trans. Hazel Barnes
(New York: Knopf, 1963), pp. 150 ff. A case might
be made that such a view also informs Kant's moral
philosophy; at least, it seems to be present in the
neo-Kantian interpretations of Rousseau, such as those
of Ernst Cassirer and Robert DerathM. For example,
see Derath6's discussion in his Le Rationalisme de
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1948), pp. 182ff.
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no such thing as a separate human species,
strictly speaking. This is perhaps what Aristotle means by saying that there is no human
virtue or excellence in being healthy.18 Human
activity connected with the provision of the
commodities that can support and secure human life does not, by itself, yield an answer
to the question of the best human life. The only
virtue belonging to our desire for private possessions-food, wealth, ornament, and so onlies in the subordination of that desire to some
other principle. From the perspective of ancient political philosophy, then, there is no such
thing as a good or excellent or virtuous economic man (meaning by this term someone
who is entirely devoted to and adept in the art
of survival).19
Roughly speaking, there are two ways in
which this subordination can take place: the
political life and the philosophic life. Politics
here is understood to be a relationship among
individual human beings in which some public
value or law takes the place of private desire as
the most authoritative guide to action. Politics,
from this perspective, is not understood as being constituted by any contract or obligation,
but rather by the attempt to replace the human
capacity for selfishness by the human capacity
for justice (however understood) and selfcontrol as the principal motivating factor in
human action. Politics is said to be a choiceworthy way of life because it is the medium
within which the development of moral virtue
Politics 7. 13., Nicomachean Ethics 1. 13.
19I will be using the opposition economic
man/
political man throughout this paper. It is intended
to express the distinction between a life directed by
private or personal desire or inclination, and a life
directed by a strong sense of public duty. "Economic,"
as I use it, then, is not to be equated with "commercial" (since it could also refer to crime, selfdefense, art, and hobbies), although commercial activity is one of the most common and important
forms of economic activity, in my sense of the word.
The idea of economic activity (in this broad sense)
as opposed and in some way prior to political activity is discussed by Aristotle Politics 3. 5., and
by Plato in his description of the immediate predecessor of the genuine polis in the Republic Book II,
371d4ff. The applicability of the concept of economic
man to early modern political thought is suggested
by C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(London:
Oxford University
Press, 1964), and by Leo Strauss, Natural Right and
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953),
chapter 5. John Rawls places himself squarely in
this tradition of political thought when he argues
for the appropriateness
of the model of rational
(economic)
choice for all moral and political situations. For Rawls, political philosophy is understood
to be a special case (choice under uncertainty)
of
the theory of rational choice. A Theory of Justice,
"8Aristotle

p. 172.
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or virtues (such as justice and self-control) are
possible. Man is by nature the political animal
not because he ordinarily lives in things called
cities or polities, but because it is through politics and the political relationship (as opposed,
say, to the economic) that human beings can
achieve that excellence of character (moral
virtue) which is potential in their nature. To
say that an individual is living politically or
according to moral virtue is to say something
about the principles according to which he acts,
the goals he tries to attain and the values he
tries to maximize in his decisions and his practices. The character of these principles, goals,
and values provides the critical difference between the private or economic life and the
public or political life. Politics, then, is understood as the pursuit of a certain way or style
of life, rather than as obedience to a certain
type of authority;20 what distinguishes politics
from other activities are its ends or purposes
rather than its manner of institution.21 The difference between these two conceptions of politics appears in the two questions which they
might pose in the process of determining
whether a particular association were political
(as opposed to merely economic or despotic):
Aristotle and Plato would ask, Is it according
to nature (Does it enhance the strictly human
aspects of human nature) ?,22 while the greater
part of modern political philosophy, following
Rousseau, would say, Is it legitimate (Is control founded on consent)? For both Aristotle
and Rousseau, a theoretical understanding of
politics requires a distinction between what is
called political and what is genuinely political;
20 Rawls excludes the issue of ways of life from
the range of rational deliberation on fundamental
political questions. Rational public decisions can only
be made about the distribution of primary social
goods, not about the encouragement of certain life
styles or ways of life making use of those goods.
Rawls, pp. 142-145. Both Hampshire, p. 38, and
Cohen, p. 18, in their reviews of Rawls, regard this
as a shortcoming of Rawls's theory of justice.
21 This is not to say that the ends of a polity and
its manner of institution (or integration) may not
have real consequences for one another, but that
what is most particularly important about politics
(as a distinct human activity) are its ends or goals.
2 Plato is surely not as firmly committed as Aristotle to the appropriateness of the natural standard
for evaluating politics. This will appear, I think, if
we compare Book 1 of the Politics with the cave
story and the myth of Er in the Republic. Plato's
doubts, however, seem to center not on the suitability of the natural standard for judging politics,
but on whether the differences among polities are
significant in the light of the natural standard. In
other words, the doubt is not about the standard,
but about politics.
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the two differ with respect to the terms in
which this distinction should be drawn.23
The problem of distinguishing politics as a
separate way of life does end with the exhibition of the line between the political and the
subpolitical; for ancient philosophy, the question, How ought we to live? can not be restated
as the choice between pursuing politics and pursuing private (economic) goals. There is a
third possible alternative for human beings,
resting upon a third potentially dominant principle of human nature, and that is the life of
the philosopher, the way of life displayed by
Socrates. This life is the attempt to actualize to
the fullest possible extent the human capacity
for rational understanding. If the economic life
is dominated by the love of self (or of life),
and the political life by a love of the city (and
of having a "good name" in the city), the
philosophic life is controlled by the love of
truth or of being.24 The excellence which belongs to this way of life is called, by Aristotle,
intellectual virtue. According to both Plato and
Aristotle, the philosophic life is unquestionably
superior to the political life for the same reason
that politics is superior to the economic life: it
corresponds to a superior aspect of human
capacity, to a higher part of human nature.
One way to understand this determination of
superiority is to compare the three possible
ways of life with respect to their self-sufficiency.
Economic man's needs are practically limitless;
he is Hobbes's natural man, committed to a
perpetual and (finally) perpetually hopeless
search for security and well-being. Political man
is less concerned with security than with acting
well, being just, courageous, and so on. But
political activity of this sort requires more than
the simple possession of a good character, even
where good character is accompanied by good
judgment; opportunity and means are as necessary as motive for the commission of political
or moral acts, and neither a citizen nor a city
has much hope of achieving political excellence if restricted by poverty, weakness, and
isolation. Although the dependence on con23
For Aristotle, the distinction has to be made in
teleological terms. See Politics 3. 5. Consider also
his discussion of citizenship in Book 3 of the Politics, which turns on the difference between those
who are really citizens and those who are only called
citizens. The difference between the merely conventional and the real citizen is stated in terms of the
purpose of politics.
2 The
description and comparison of different
ways of life in terms of their desiring or erotic dimension is provided by Plato in the Republic Book
5, 474c8 to the end of Book 5.
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tingency is less, successful politics, like the
quest for security, requires favorable external
circumstances. But this is not true of the wise
man, of the person who can successfully pursue
the philosophic way of life and claim intellectual virtue.25 All that the wise man requires
to exercise his wisdom is his mind and the
universe. Of course, a wise man is still a human
being and not a disembodied spirit; he at least
needs food and shelter, just as you and I, and
as such he is surely dependent upon circumstance in the way that all human beings are.
But the philosopher as philosopher, that is,
while he is engaged in the activity of understanding which marks him as a man of intellectual virtue, is utterly self-sufficient in a way
that can not be matched by the man of moral
virtue, the political man, in his characteristic
activity.
This discussion began with a distinction between two kinds of political inquiry, the one
(the more modern and familiar) beginning
with the question, Why should I obey the laws?
(or, What can make obedience legitimate?),
and the other with the question, What is the
best life for man? It was suggested that one
difficulty with the first approach is that it may
not be able to distinguish authority from
power, or to give an account or defense of
politics as an independently valuable kind of
activity. But now it seems that the second
variety of political philosophy leads by a different route to a similar difficulty. In the first
case, politics threatens to slip beyond the horizon of human aspiration, while in the second
it descends beneath human dignity. For if,
according to Plato and Aristotle, the philosophic life is the best life for man, the way of
life which best answers to the potentiality of
human nature, then what becomes of politics,
the way of life whose virtue is principally moral
(of character or disposition) rather than intellectual (of understanding)? I have suggested
that for ancient philosophy politics is understood to claim our admiration because at its
best it can turn us from selfishness to moral
virtue. But how can one continue to praise
moral virtue in the light of the enormous superiority of intellectual virtue? From the perspective of the philosophic life, at least, differ25 In speaking of "philosophers" here I am not
referring to the substantial professional group that
sometimes goes by that name. I am also obscuring,
because of the nature of this introductory context,
any possible differences between a philosopher (a
lover of truth and wisdom) and a wise man (a possessor of truth).
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ences between the best statesman and the worst
murderer or tyrant may appear to be insignificant or largely accidental.26
Now the thrust of this implicit attack on the
political life is tempered to a certain extent
because the perspective of philosophy is also
presented by the ancients as being incredibly
difficult to obtain, so difficult that a general
recommendation to live a life of pure intellection would be as absurd as recommending a
life consisting of an infinite series of four
minute miles. Still, I do not mean to suggest
that the assertion of the difficulty (and for
most men, the impossibility) of living the
philosophic life in any way removes the difficulty about justifying moral virtue or politics.
No matter how few individuals have the natural equipment to aspire to a life of intellectual virtue, it remains the best life for
human beings as such (and hence, in principle,
for all human beings insofar as they are human); this conclusion about the best life has
the force of consigning all but a very few to
lives which are subhuman in that they can not
be justified or defended by word or reason
(logos) rather than by brute force. The human
situation seems to be defined by the not altogether free choice between two alternatives:
the philosophic life, which is incredibly difficult but of superhuman sublimity; and the
private life, which involves satisfying the most
powerful of human passions and desires, and is
thus easy, but (nonmetaphorically) brutally inhuman. Politics and moral virtue, if they exist
at all, are located between these two variously
disquieting human possibilities. Strange as it
surely sounds to our ears, the problem of politics, the question of whether or not (and in
what way) politics is a valuable and justifiable
life style appears, in this analysis, to be identical with the problem of moral virtue. Before
turning to some of the consequences of this
conception of the problem of politics, let me
step back for a moment and try to clarify the
basic vocabulary of the political problem understood as the problem of moral virtue.
2"It can be argued that this is, in fact, the Platonic
view. See Statesman 257b2-4, and Republic Book
10, 619b7-dl. Sometimes Plato does suggest there
can be substantial differences in quality among different nonphilosophic ways of life. But these suggestions often appear to rest upon what are for Plato
suspect (or nonphilosophic) premises, such as the
quantifiability of human happiness (Republic Book
9, 587blO-588alO; Protagoras 356c4-357b5), or the
adequacy of traditional piety (Crito 53a9-54dl). This is
not to say that these differences are unimportant from
some nonphilosophic perspective-such as that of
the citizen.
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Kinds of Virtue
I have been employing the concepts "moral"
and "intellectual virtue" without defining them
directly, hoping to indicate some of their sense
contextually. Any definition would have to begin by confessing that they are, in fact, fairly
literal translations of the Greek expressions
areti ethiki and arete dianojtike. Undoubtedly,
some more idiomatic and familiar translation
would have been possible, but I have chosen to
say "moral virtue" and "intellectual virtue" in
spite of the odd and stilted sound of these
phrases because I want to emphasize, rather
than conceal, the fact that these concepts are
foreign to our contemporary political vocabulary and political understanding. The value of
discussing politics by means of these terms depends in large measure upon their difference
from the political language we have become
accustomed to using, the language which is
informed by political obligation and legitimacy.
If, as I shall try to suggest, there is some
plausible doubt concerning the value or the
usefulness of the language of political obligation, it would be foolish to try to translate all
unfamiliar political philosophy into that language, as for instance by setting out to discover
Aristotle's or Plato's theory of political obligation, when it would be much more important
to know why these writers do not speak of a
theory of political obligation, but speak of
moral and political virtues instead. So it will
be necessary to risk seeming pompous and
stuffy, for the sake of exploring the meaning
and consequences of this generally forgotten or
rejected way of considering politics.
One of the major problems in translating
areti by "virtue" is that the Greek word has
a much more extensive signification than does
the modern English one. Aretj does mean
virtue or goodness, but it also refers to a
quality we would be more likely to call "excellence." For example, a skilled shoemaker, or
painter, or athlete might be said to possess
virtue in the sense of areti; the same would be
true for a fast horse, a strong ox, or a prize
pumpkin: generally, a subject is said to be
virtuous (possess the quality of areti) when
he displays skill in or aptitude for a particular
sort of activity. A thing done well thus becomes
a thing done virtuously, and the doer is said
to be virtuous insofar as that particular activity is concerned; this does not mean that a
virtuous shoemaker, or craftsman, or merchant
is necessarily a virtuous human being. This is
a very broad meaning of "virtue," much different from our own which seems to refer
mainly to chastity or innocence and perhaps
also to a rather more than slightly unbalanced
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asceticism. From this perspective, it naturally
seems very odd to see Plato and Aristotle talking about virtue being the principal concern of
politics. The oddness is certainly and genuinely
there, but it is possible and necessary to climb
out of the confines of our ordinary language
at least to the extent of not confusing oddness
with unintelligibility. My purpose in thus contrasting the ancient and the contemporary
meanings of virtue is certainly not to sneer at
any supposed moral decay, but rather to warn
against the warm and comfortable feeling that
we have somehow or other gone beyond confusing virtue and politics. In a sense, we have
"gone beyond" understanding virtue as being
conduct being unpolitically relevant-good
derstood for the most part as being a strictly
private matter-but it is not true that this
going beyond simply involves the obviously desirable rejection of an absurd and oppressive
dogma.
It appears that according to ancient philosophy, the relationship between politics and virtue can be stated as follows: the city (or polity
or political community) is that structure (or
pattern of relationships) which has as its aim
the development of moral virtue among its
citizens. Polities or political systems can, in
principle, be evaluated on the basis of how
successfully they carry out this function, bearing in mind that the success or failure of a
polity, like that of moral virtue itself, is dependent upon circumstance as well as upon intention. One can hardly blame a poor city or
nation, or one which is under severe and continual military attack, for failing to educate its
citizens in those virtues which require leisure
and peace for their exercise. Still, the principle
of moral virtue provides the basic rule for judging politics, and for deciding whether the political life (either as such or in a given city)
is justifiable: the meaning and the possibility of
politics stands or falls with the meaning and
the possibility of moral virtue. This is not to
say that the standard of virtue is an easy or a
clear one to apply;27 a much clearer assessment can be made by applying one of the more
27 The most consistent application of a standard
of this kind is to be found in Aristotle's Politics,
perhaps most clearly in Book 7. J. J. Mulhern explains the complexity of the Aristotelian standard in
"Pantachou Kata Physin he AristZ," Phronesis, 12
(1972), 260-268. See also Plato Republic Book 10,
599c6-d4, Montesquieu, De l'Esprit des Lois, vol. I,
Book 5, and Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and
Sciences. The applicability of such a standard to contemporary politics is considered by Walter Berns,
"Pornography vs. Democracy: A Case for Censorship,"
Public Interest, 22 (Winter, 1971), 3-24, and by
Wilson Carey McWilliams's response to Berns, in the
same issue, pp. 32-38.
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typical contemporary rules, like level of economic growth, or level of individual liberty, or
even level of legitimacy (perhaps defined as
the extent of public approval of the regime, or
the consent of the governed). The great difficulty with moral virtue as a rule of political
evaluation comes from the difficulty of saying
just what moral virtue is, even if we grant the
possibility that it is, in fact, some thing at all.
But leaving aside for the moment the question of what the content of moral virtue is, we
are in a position to say what kind of thing it is
we are looking for: moral virtue is that quality
on account of whose presence we praise actions or characters as being good. Furthermore,
it appears to be something different from and
inferior to intellectual virtue, a quality which
distinguishes good understandings or minds.
Since human life can presumably be primarily
devoted either to action or to contemplation
(or understanding), the moral question of the
greatest importance becomes how, and under
what conditions, one should choose to commit
oneself either to action or to contemplation. As
suggested above, when the problem is stated in
this way it becomes very difficult to see how
anyone could defend, as opposed to simply excusing, the choice of the political life. But
perhaps this problem can be avoided by examining more closely some other aspects of the
relationship between moral and intellectual
virtue, aside from the simple assertion of the
superiority of intellectual virtue with respect to
the criterion of self-sufficiency.
The complexity of the relationship begins to
appear when we notice that to state the problem of moral and intellectual virtue in terms of
the necessity to choose between them obscures
the fact that action generally involves thought
of some sort (like the choice to act or not to
act in a certain way) and that even the most
abstract contemplation is in some sense relevant
to action, at least in the sense that it involves
or requires abstention from action. We might
say that political or moral men necessarily
philosophize to a certain extent, and that philosophers are politicians whether they will it or
not. In other words, that thought and action
cannot, as a matter of fact, be indifferent to
one another; no account of politics can be
complete without a consideration of the effect
of politics upon contemplation, and any account of the pursuit of wisdom or scientific
inquiry would have to be concerned with the
political or moral consequences of following the
life of intellectual virtue.28 For example, if we
28 Aristotle
Nicomachean
Ethics Book 10, 1178bl10; Politics Book 8, 1325a-b; Plato Republic, Book
1, 347b5-d9. One of the great questions of the Re-
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praise intellectual virtue (as ancient philosophy
does) as being the best life a human being can
choose to follow, we are not only providing an
implicit criticism of the political or moral life
but actually recommending a course of conduct
which will tend to detract from the amount of
human energy devoted to politics. Given the
inaccessibility of the intellectual or scientific
life for most people, it might well be that the
praise of contemplation involves the commission of a very great wrong. Whether or how
this is so can only be known if we can give
an account of the value of moral virtue, if we
can justify the political life as being preferable
to the life devoted to the private pursuit of
privately defined goals, which I have called the
economic life. The problem of political philosophy, beginning from the question, What is the
best life for man? becomes the problem of intellectual and moral virtue: How, on what
grounds, can one justify the pursuit of a way
of life which falls far short of the horizon of
human potentiality? That this is a genuine question, one to which more than one answer is
possible, is clear, I think, to anyone who has
puzzled over the work of Plato and Aristotle,29
or, for that matter, of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
who in a curious way appears to employ at
different times both the language of virtue and,
as noted earlier, the language of obligation.30
I am suggesting here that the idea of moral
and intellectual virtue is not in itself a doctrine
or theory, but rather a question or perspective
on the basis of which moral or political philosophy can be formulated.31 One might say that
public is that of the compatibility of the requirements
of justice with the requirements of the happiness
of the philosopher. As Simon Aronson says, "If Plato
does opt for making the city happy, and thus devises
ways of persuading the philosopher [to be just], his
recognition of the possible need to 'compel' (520a8)
indicates his awareness that the tension is a real
one." "The Happy Philosopher: A Counter-Example
to Plato's Proof," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 10 (October, 1972), 383-398, at 396.
29 Consider,
for example, Aristotle's criticism of
Plato's analysis of the polis in Politics 2. 1., and of
the Platonic analysis of the good in Nicomachean
Ethics 1. 6.
30 Compare the understanding of politics displayed
in the Social Contract with that of the Discourse on
the Arts and Sciences. For a discussion of the problem of Rousseau's political language, see Michel
Launay, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ecrivain Politique,"
L'Information Litteraire, 22 (September, 1970), 157163. Rousseau's awareness of the problem is indicated in his "Preface d'une Seconde Lettre a Bordes,"
O.C., III, p. 105.
"Another way of putting this would be to say
that virtue is to be taken here as a general concept
rather than a particular conception. For a discussion
of this distinction with reference to American constitutional concepts and conceptions, see R. Dworkin,
"Nixon's Jurisprudence," New York Review of Books
(May 4, 1972), pp. 27-35.
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it provides the beginnings of a language for the
discussion of political questions. As we have
seen, the question of virtue turns out to involve a series of questions, starting with, What
is the best human life? From this question arise
the issues concerning the merits of different
styles or ways of life founded upon the devotion to actions of various kinds, and of
various styles of inactivity or contemplation:
what is the good of being a craftsman or a
statesman or an entrepreneur or a soldier, and
what is good about being a philosopher or a
scientist or an artist or a mystic. Once these
questions have been considered, we are then
faced with the question of the relationship between the virtues of contemplation and the
political or moral virtues: Are they compatible?
Are they simply the reflections of one single
human excellence in different contexts? Is any
mediation or compromise possible between
them, and so on. As I say, these are simply
questions, to which there are several conceivable answers, as might be seen from a comparative study of the works of Aristotle and
Rousseau. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to
stress the nature of these questions because
they are fundamentally different from the questions which inform serious political inquiry at
the present time. Given this relative absence of
the concept of virtue from the vocabulary of
contemporary political philosophy (as compared with the ubiquity of concepts like liberty, authority, obligation, legitimacy and related contract-linked concepts),32 two questions
present themselves: why we no longer speak of
virtue when we speak of politics, and whether
there is any reason to be dissatisfied with the
present state of affairs. In the remainder of this
paper I will suggest that this transformation is
by no means accidental or superficial, but is
rather linked with particular conceptions of the
purpose of politics and of the character of
meaningful discourse about politics. I will also
try to indicate that this conception of politics
may be unsatisfactory by virtue of being too
narrow to deal with many important phenomena that appear to be politically relevant.
This criticism by no means calls for a rejection
of the language of political obligation as in itself misleading or erroneous; rather, I suggest
that there is a sufficient doubt concerning the
utility of the modern conception of politics to
make the serious consideration of an alternative
conception a reasonable and even necessary undertaking.
32 This characteristic of the modern language of
moral and political philosophy is discussed by
Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy."
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Alternatives to Political Virtue
The central question of the language which
understands virtue and politics to be nearly
inseparable considerations is What is the best
human life? Now if it can be shown that this
question is absurd and unintelligible, if in principle no reasonable answer to it can be provided, then the question and the substantive
political teachings which follow from it are
meaningless and fit to be discarded. Plato and
Aristotle presupposed that a rational, nonidiosyncratic answer33 to this question is possible;
such a presupposition is necessary if one is
going to speak about politics in terms of virtue,
although there is no necessity that the implicit
assertion must itself always remain a presupposition: one may sooner or later be able to
give a reasoned account of why the question
is answerable, but in the beginning it is necessary to presuppose the meaningfulness of the
question as a question. Now one of the defining characteristics of early modern philosophy is that it was, in several ways, engaged in
the business of calling this presupposition into
question, along the way to rejecting it as absurd. First of all, it was asserted that although
we can give an answer to the question of how
we ought to live, this answer will be so far
removed from how we do in fact live as to be
practically or politically irrelevant. According
to this view, knowledge of how we ought to
live is not in any way a reasonable or a sensible
guide to conduct. The most famous expression
of this assertion is Machiavelli's, in Chapter 15
of The Prince. According to this position, the
question of moral virtue may be appropriate in
some contexts, but not in the sphere of politics. It is not a very great step from asserting
the impracticality of a political philosophy that
takes its bearings from the question of virtue
to an assertion of the unintelligibility or absurdity of this kind of political understandingan understanding which claims to provide the
true conception of practice or action, which
insists upon the interdependence of morality
and politics.34
But if moral virtue is not a political term,
then it can apply only to private relationships,
"The special quality of the answer in question
could be expressed succinctly by the Greek logo,
which would suggest an answer by means of that
reason which is expressed in human speech. The
argument that the task of any moral philosophy is
to supply "the ultimate grounds for preferring one
way of life to another" is made by Stuart Hampshire,
"Morality and Pessimism," New York Review of
Books (January 25, 1973), 26-33, at 27.
34 This
step is very concisely set forth in the first
paragraph of Chapter 11 of Hobbes's Leviathan.
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that is to say, to relationships that are not regulated by any common authoritative standard.
There is then something fundamentally wrong
with a political system which claims to have as
its primary concern the production of moral
virtue in its citizens; morality may be the appropriate concern of churches, of families, of
voluntary associations, but not of politics and
government. For Hobbes and Locke, the proper
concern of the polity, the reason for which the
social contract comes into being, is the protection and security of the individuals who, as
it were, hold shares in the polity. Political authority, law, and constraint are justified not
insofar as they tend to produce political or
moral man, but rather insofar as they tend to
protect economic man, the individual who is
free to pursue whatever he desires. This idea of
the purpose of politics, and of the true meaning
of "political" or "civil," is expressed with admirable concision by John Locke in A Letter
Concerning Toleration:
The commonwealth seems to me to be a society
of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests.
Civil interests I call life, liberty, health and
indolency of body; and the possession of outward
things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture
and the like.'
Politics is not properly concerned with the promotion of a specific and distinct way of life,
but only with the protection of privately determined enterprises.
The mention of Locke in this context no
doubt tends to emphasize the connection between this view of politics-the view that the
proper concern of politics is the service of
economic man-and the liberal tradition. This
conception of politics is surely linked with liberalism, but it is just as surely not identical
with liberalism, being much more inclusive
than that particular doctrine. The pervasiveness
of this understanding of politics in modern
times will appear if we consider that the beneficiary and the justification of the antiliberal
and revolutionary politics of Karl Marx is presented not as a political man or a man of
moral virtue, but as a free spirit. The purpose
and justification of communist society is that it
"makes it possible for me to do one thing today
and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning,
fish in the afternoon, breed cattle in the eve3
Locke, Second Treatise of Government and A
Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. J. W. Gough (Oxford:
Blackwell's
Political Texts, Basil Blackwell,
1946),
p. 128. See also Second Treatise, chapter 11, section
134, p. 67.
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ning, criticize after dinner, just as I like. ..."36
In spite of the undeniable and important points
of opposition in the substantive political teachings of John Locke and Karl Marx, both appear
to understand true politics (as opposed to mere
tyranny) to be fundamentally concerned with
the protection of what I have been calling economic man. Thus what seems to many to be
the principal political alternatives of our time
are both animated (and thus to a certain extent defined) by a concern for liberty rather
than for virtue, and by the understanding that
the answer to the question of the best human
life can not receive a political (or any sort of
public) solution. For both Locke's householder
and Marx's interested amateur, the question of
how we ought to live must be treated as a
matter of taste.
The first modern criticism of the question of
the best life for man is, then, that it is politically irrelevant. The second criticism to be considered here, and one which serves as the
epistemological or theoretical foundation of the
first, is the assertion that the question cannot be
answered in a rational way. To inquire about
the best life for man presupposes that there is
some "best" or most "virtuous" life which is
distinct from the lives which any number of
particular individuals may choose to lead. In
other words, it presupposes the intelligibility of
the distinction between what is good for human
beings as human beings and what is pleasant to
(or desired by) individual men and women.
But it can be doubted that goodness or virtue
exists, or, at least, that these qualities can be
perceived by the human mind as having an
existence distinct from that of pleasure. It
would be impossible to summarize here all the
arguments that have been developed to support
this doubt, and so I will simply refer to some
of the better-known conclusions. The most fundamental of these may well be the assertion
that the question of virtue, of the best life,
cannot be settled by rational inquiry. Our ideas
of virtue are (on this view), like our feelings
of pleasure, the consequence of private and
particular sensation, rather than of publicly
36 Marx
and Engels, German Ideology, Part I, in
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy
and
Society, ed. and trans. Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H.
Guddat (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 424-425. Even in his
direct confrontation
with the liberal view, On the
Jewish Question
(in Easton and Guddat),
Marx
criticizes the liberals not in the name of equality or
community, but of liberty or emancipation. An interesting commentary on the passage in question is provided by Michael Walzer, "A Day in the Life of a
Socialist Citizen," in Walzer, Obligations (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 229ff.
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demonstrable reasoning.37 We may say what
virtue or the best life is, but (it is asserted) we
cannot defend (by referring to supporting reasons) our answer against any other moral proposal or preference. The attempt to philosophize about the best life appears to rest upon a
mistaken notion of our idea of virtue; it has
become almost a philosophical commonplace to
say that the attempt to discover the truth about
how we ought to live is founded on a logical
error. Indeed, it is claimed, there is no rational
way to distinguish virtue from pleasure, or what
is needed from what is wanted, or what is desirable from what is desired.38 Moral and political
philosophy become theoretically incapable of
deciding among the claims presented by different
life styles and callings; all that philosophy can
do is to show that no way of life, whether of
hunter, cattle raiser, entrepreneur or critic, has
any reasonable claim to preferential treatment
or regard over any other way of life.39
The question of political obligation seems to
arise almost naturally from the situation created by the demise of the question of how we
ought to live; it is the logical candidate to fill
the vacuum in political philosophy left by the
rejection on epistemological and metaphysical
grounds of the question of virtue.40 If no way
of life can authoritatively and finally claim to
"Perhaps
the most influential and painstaking development of this position is David Hume's, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III, Part I, sections 1-2.
38 As in J. S. Mill's famously ambiguous claim that
"the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire
it." Utilitarianism, chapter 4, in The Philosophy of
John Stuart Mill, ed. Marshall Cohen (New York:
The Modern Library, Random House, 1961), p. 363.
39Rawls attempts to demonstrate the rationality of
a rule of justice requiring preferential treatment for
the least favored members of society. As Rawls indicates, however, the rationality of this rule depends
upon the rationality of something like what game
theorists call a maximum strategy in matters of fundamental political choice. That this strategy is the rationally appropriate one in this circumstance is open
to question, as in the reviews by Cohen (p. 18) and
by Hampshire (p. 39) and by Kenneth J. Arrow,
"Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian
Notes on Rawls's Theory
of Justice," Journal of Philosophy,
70 (May 10,
1973), 245-263.
40 This is not
at all to say that the prominence of
the question of obligation
was historically
caused
solely or even primarily by events in epistemology
or metaphysics. At least part of the reason for the
pre-eminence of obligation can plausibly be ascribed
to a change in the form of the prevailing patterns of
social interaction,
roughly described by the transition from face to face communities to the distinction
between state and society. See Euben, "Walzer's Obligations," pp. 439-440. Similarly, a strong case can
be made for assigning the decisive part in this transition to Christianity, as suggested by Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York:
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be superior to any other, and if each individual
is thus in principle free to choose or create his
own standards or rules of conduct, what are we
to say about the ordinary human situation characterized by a submission to authority and an
obedience to laws we never made? To ask this
question is to state the modern paradox of
liberty and authority posed in classic form by
Rousseau in the Social Contract. What is the
ground, the justification, of the obligation or
duty to obey the law? When is obedience the
result of obligation rather than of oppression
and coercion? Perhaps the most obvious solution
is to say that freedom itself is the ground of
obligation: obedience to law alone makes possible that security which is the necessary condition of freedom.41 In this manner, politics
would appear to be justifiable or legitimate
(and "authority" thus different from "power")
insofar as politics exists for the sake of economic man. In other words, we ought to obey
the law because it is in the interest of our
freedom to do so. Politics thus conceived appears as a second-rate and inconvenient activity, yet one which is necessary to protect us
in our real (i.e., economic or private) existence. Public obedience is the necessary, though
unpleasant, price of private freedom.
But the argument which thus employs a reference to liberty as the ground of political
obligation creates certain difficulties. According
to this argument, we are bound to politics by
an obligation which is only prudential (valid
only so long as it is in our interest) rather
than strictly moral (always and necessarily
valid as a matter of duty).42 If it is not in my
interest (as economic man) to obey the rules
Dover, 1956), introduction,
p. 18 and part IV, p.
342, and by Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality
and Religion, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley
Brereton (Garden
City, N.Y.:
Doubleday,
1935),
chapter 4. My point is rather that the philosophic
significance of the question of obligation (and thus
its theoretical, if not its historical, justification)
can
be grasped by a consideration
of the theoretical
grounds for discarding the question of virtue.
41 Such
a view is almost formulaic in early modern
political thought. Among others, see Montesquieu,
De l'Esprit des Lois, Vol. I, Book 12, Chapters 1-2
(Paris:
Garnier Freres, 1961),
pp. 196-197,
and
Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 21.
' This distinction rests on Kant's distinction between a kind of hypothetical
and a
(nonmoral)
categorical
(moral) imperative. See Foundations
of
the Metaphysics
of Morals, trans. Lewis W. Beck
(Indianapolis:
Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), section II, p. 33. For the use of this
distinction in the context of the question of moral
obligation, see Alan Gewirth, "Must One Play the
Moral
Language
Game,"
American
Philosophical
Quarterly, 7 (April, 1970), 107-118. See also H. A.
Prichard, Moral Obligation, pp. 90-91.
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(as political man), then these rules are no
longer legitimately binding or obligatory, so
far as I am concerned. There can be no legitimate authority which runs counter to individual interest, since political (obligated) man
is only a specialized role or aspect of economic
(free) man. Law and government are either an
exercise of power which is in my interest or
one which is counter to my interest, but there
is no reason to conclude that "authority" is
anything more than a name we give to the
useful or beneficial (to us) exercise of power
(by others).
What we call "political obligation" turns out to be nothing more than a
rather unimportant aspect of the general maximizing strategy pursued by economic man.44
Now this conclusion may be absolutely true; I
am not here suggesting that it rests upon false
premises or bad argument. But leaving aside
the question of its truth or error for the moment, it should be noted that the attempt to
resolve the problem of political obligation by
reference to the principle of liberty ends by
calling into question the meaning of political
activity as anything more than a special case of
economic activity. This particular approach to
the problem of political obligation, which we
might without too much distortion identify as
the liberal or utilitarian approach,45 seems in
the end to be unable to do what it set out
to do, namely, to distinguish the political from
the nonpolitical without recourse to the no
longer accepted language of moral virtue and
the question of the best life." If it were not
"IThis confusion of authority and power would
still exist even if we were to assume the rather unlikely condition that obedience to law will always
be in our (or everyone's) interest.
4""Unimportant" in that it deals only with minimal and instrumental necessities, the items Rawls
identifies as "primary social goods," and does not
concern the more important question of what to do
with the goods.
43Although this position is characteristic of a certain kind of modern political thought, it was by no
means unknown to Plato and Aristotle. Consider
Glaucon's speech about the value of justice in Republic Book II; the speech of Callicles in the Gorgias 483b4-484c4; Aristotle's criticism of the sophist
Lycophron in Politics Book 3, 1280bl1-13; and especially the statement by Antiphon the Sophist, On
Truth, Fragment B44 in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 7th ed., ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz (Berlin:
Weidmann, 1951-54), vol. 2, 346-355. Something
of a confrontation between this view and the position of ancient political philosophy is presented by
Xenophon in his descriptions of three conversations
between Socrates and Antiphon, Memorabilia Book
I, chapter 6. The basic disagreement appears to be
over the issue of human needs. On this meeting, see
Leo Strauss, Xenophon's Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1972), pp. 28-31.
41 One of the most systematic
attempts to accom-
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for the powerful influences of custom and coercion, the public order would lose its privileged status, and the private order would rise
up to claim what is, after all, legitimately
its own.
Perhaps the most interesting contemporary
alternative to the appeal to liberty as a ground
of obligation is the appeal to "community."
This view, perhaps most forcefully presented by
Hannah Arendt,47 is in an important way a
direct response to the difficulties that I have
claimed are endemic in the liberal position.48
I will ignore here the question of the foundations of the "community" position (except to
say that it also, like the liberal view, rejects the
orientation provided by the question of the
best life), and merely present what I take to
be its most important conclusions or assertions.
Principally, it asserts that genuine political activity can have absolutely nothing to do with
the needs of what I have referred to as economic man; a truly political relationship (such
as the relationships of obligation and authority)
can have no connection with private selfinterest of any sort.49 Politics itself must be
modate the question of the best life to the question
of liberty is made by Mill in Utilitarianism, especially in the context of the distinction between higher
and lower pleasures drawn in chapter 2 of that essay. Whether Mill was successful is extremely controversial. A neo-Kantian refutation of Mill is given
by R. P. Wolff, Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968), chapter 1. That Mill was unsuccessful
in his attempt to reconcile liberty and duty is also
argued by Hilail Gildin, "Mill's On Liberty," in
Joseph Cropsey, ed., Ancients and Moderns (New
York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 288-303. An argument for Mill's consistency is given by Rex Martin,
"A Defence of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism," Philosophy, 47 (April, 1972), 140-151.
IT See especially Hannah Arendt "What is Freedom?"
in Between Past and Future (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1963), pp. 143-171, and The Human
Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1958), chapters 2 and 5. Arendt's argument that the
source of this view can be traced to Greek political
practice seems to me highly questionable; but this
problem has no bearing on the significance of the conception of politics involved. See also Kirk Thompson, "Constitutional Theory and Political Action,"
Journal of Politics, 31 (August, 1969), 655-681.
48Wolff's argument in The Poverty of Liberalism
proceeds from a rejection of the liberal position as
logically inconsistent, to an attempt to demonstrate
the existence (in principle) of a political community
which can serve as the source of authority and obligation.
49 Just as, for Kant, a truly good action can have
no connection with self-interest. Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals, Preface, p. 6; Section I,
p. 13. On this point, Rawls is much closer to Mill
than to Kant, in his argument that political principles must be in the interest of each individual for
social control to be just or legitimate. See A Theory
of Justice, Section 29.
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considered a valuable activity, and the obligation to obey the law is simply a consequence
of membership in the political community. As
soon as we demand that politics be good for
something other than itself (except insofar
as it may be understood to satisfy the irreducible human need for communal ties) it
ceases to be politics. Needless to say, political
relationships of this sort are extremely rare in
those activities we ordinarily call political, at
least at the present time. Politics in this sense,
or political community as the true ground of
political obligation, appears as something to be
achieved or recovered.
At first sight, these two relatively modern
understandings of politics, revolving about the
concepts of "liberty" and "community" respectively, appear to be diametrically opposed to one
another. In fact, it may not be a great exaggeration to say that they constitute the poles of whatever contemporary debate there is about the
nature of politics and the character of political
relationships. But I want to suggest that these
two positions have a great deal more in common
than is ordinarily supposed, and that they do not
exhaust (as we are too apt to suppose they do)
the possibilities for understanding and evaluating political activity. One indication of the similarity of these two is that they both identify politics as the necessary condition of human freedom. According to Arendt, the political community (like the moral community for Kant) is
the sphere of freedom;50 according to liberals,
politics is indeed the realm of constraint, but of
a kind of constraint that is necessary to protect
and enhance the realm of true freedom. To be
sure, "freedom" is understood quite differently
in the two different cases (the former generally
implying a variety of self-determination, while
the latter generally refers to a straightforward
absence of external restraint), but the debate
5 "Freedom as a demonstrable fact and politics
coincide and are related to each other like two
sides of the same matter" ("What Is Freedom?," p.
149). This conception of freedom and politics as
coterminous and inseparable is similar to Marx's assertion that unalienated (or free) human activity is
species (or political) activity. See "Alienated Labor,"
in Easton and Guddat, p. 294. Another directly related formulation is implicit in Rousseau's position
that since freedom and citizenship are inseparable,
and since citizenship is not always pleasant or in
one's interest (and hence not always or necessarily
immediately chosen for its own sake), some men
will have to be "forced to be free" (Social Contract,
bk. I, chap. 7, O.C., Vol. III, 364). For a comparison (from a liberal viewpoint) of something like
the two concepts of liberty I have been considering
here, see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty,"
in his Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 118-172.
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between these two positions seems not to be
about the respective merits of individuality versus commonality as ways of life, as much as
it is about the true meaning of being free.5'
The reverse side of this concern with freedom
is an almost complete avoidance of any serious
consideration of virtue, or of any of the various
questions which I indicated might come to
light from an investigation of the problem of
moral and intellectual virtue. Just as Plato and
Aristotle can be understood to be quarreling
over the question, Under what conditions can
men become truly virtuous? modern political
philosophy seems to be engaged in a debate
over the question, Under what conditions can
men become truly free?52
Conclusion
Is there any reason for dissatisfaction with
this transformation of the basic political question? Surely, it can be argued that the modern
position represents an enormous improvement
by being much more in accord with the genuine
limitations of human knowledge. If such modesty is in fact an intellectual virtue, then whatever the merits of the ancient position, it
might be based on the undoubtedly immodest
presupposition that one can give an intelligible
answer to the question of the best human life.
Claims and criticisms of this kind raise a question of the greatest importance, but one that

51An excellent illustration of the organization of
the debate in terms of a conflict over the true meaning of freedom is provided by Marx in his attack
on liberalism in the name of genuine liberation in
the essay On the Jewish Question. In criticizing liberalism for achieving "political emancipation" only,
Marx is criticizing the liberal insistence on the separation of politics and society, in which society
stands for the realm which is emancipated from political control. But, according to Marx, the real liberation of man as species-being is the emancipation
of a creature who has evolved beyond the stage of
"man as an isolated monad" (or free economic man)
and has "taken back into himself the abstract citizen [of liberalism] and in his everyday life, his individual work, and his individual relationship has
become a species-being, . . . only then is human
emancipation complete" (emphasis in text). On the
Jewish Question, in the Easton and Guddat edition,
pp. 235-241. A similar distinction is drawn by Hegel
in his argument for political (or universal) freedom
in preference to individual (or particular) freedom in
Philosophy of History, Introduction, p. 38, and in
Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (London:
Oxford University Press, 1967), sections 182-187.
2A
good discussion of this in the context of
constitutional issues is that by Walter Berns, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1957), especially
chapter 10.
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will not be discussed here. That question, as political dimension of variance, from which all
difficult as it is important, concerns the de- other aspects of political life are derived.
Let us try to see what might happen if we
termination of the reasonableness of a presupposition. Here, I would like only to suggest were to take seriously the idea that the question
why I think it is worthwhile to go to the of the presence or absence of freedom (defined
trouble of trying to revive a buried presupposi- in either of the two ways considered to this
tion. To do this I will try to show why the point) is the key or essential political question.
two modern formulations of the political ques- Consider the following situation: let us assume
tion that have been considered here are, taken a fairly constant level of either individual libtogether, unsatisfactory. I am not here con- erty or community, and then ask whether at
cerned to provide a conclusive showing of the this level we will find other differences which
wrongness of these formulations, but only to appear to call for other, unrelated, distinctions,
show why it seems advisable to think seriously or whether knowledge of the level of liberty or
community tells us, in principle, all we need
about alternatives.
When I say that the modern formulations to know about the polities in question. If we
neglect virtue, I am using that word to refer to were to choose several relatively strong communities-say,
the early Catholic Church,
any possible answer to the question of the best
way of life, and not to some particular answer: Sparta, the People's Republic of China and the
when we say how men ought to live, we say Mafia-and several relatively liberal politieswhat human virtue is.is Now, in a sense, the say, the United States of America, Athens,
modern political formulations do have some- Great Britain and Sodom-I believe that we
thing to say about how we ought to live would be confronted by a problem in political
(although this question, for them, arises only understanding which could not be resolved by
incidentally): we ought to be free,54 and poli- the language of liberty or community alone. In
tics is either the most reasonable means to that this example, we should want to be able to say
end or itself the process within which the end something about the values or the goals which
is realized. In a very broad sense, we are even are characteristic of each of these polities, in
presented with a choice between two ways of addition to considering the matter of liberty
life each of which has certain claims to be and community. These examples would appear
considered the most worthy of praise or vir- to suggest the possibility that differences in the
tuous: the life of individual liberty (of eco- uses of liberty, and in the purposes for the sake
nomic man liberated from unnecessary political of which communities may be organized, may
control) versus the life of the autonomous citi- be decisive for the character of the polity in
zen in the free community (political man lib- question. If this is so, then a political philosophy which is incapable of explaining and
erated from the impurities of economic life).
But just what sort of a choice do these alter- evaluating these differences may turn out to be
natives offer us? Both appear to involve what of very little use in the face of the most imamounts to a one-dimensional understanding of portant and the most difficult political quespolitics, in which politics are classified and tions.56 The purity of community appears to
evaluated according to the degree to which match, in narrowness and blindness to a wide
either liberty or community is said to be pres- range of politically relevant things, the wellent.55 I do not mean to deny that this dimen- known poverty of liberalism.57
That political philosophy which takes its besion is an important one; but it would be difficult to show that it is in fact the primary
5'
Of course, these may be classified as "cultural"
I

Again, at this point in the argument "virtue"
is intended as a concept rather than a conception,
in terms of the distinction referred to in note 31.
5 Freedom here is understood very broadly, and
in this sense can include an idea of security or secure preservation. An example of this usage can be
found in the passage in Montesquieu referred to in
note 41 above: "Political liberty consists in security,
or at least in the opinion that one has of one's security."
" This is the source of the distinction between the
open and the closed society. The not so remote
vulgarizations of these paired oppositions are the
popular divisions of contemporary politics into Free
World vs. Slave World, and Third (communitarian
nationalist) World vs. Imperialist (capitalist) World.

differences, and since (given cultural relativism) they
are therefore incommensurable (at least morally),
they are not fit subjects for a generalizing and evaluative political philosophy. I am not concerned here
with the possible truth of this claim (it would be
necessary to examine the plausibility of the asserted
moral incommensurability of cultural phenomena);
but note that this position implies a political philosophy which, at least in its explicitly evaluative procedures, must ignore the political consequences of
"culture."
67 This point is brilliantly, though perhaps too
briefly, made by Benjamin DeMott in his essay, "Pure
Politics," which reviews the work of Arendt and
others. DeMott, You Don't Say: Studies of Modern
American Inhibitions (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, Inc., 1966), pp. 169-182.
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ginnings from the question of political obligation appears to end by abstracting from the
variety of purposes or goals which may be said
to belong to different polities. This abstraction
is not accidental or unprepared, but follows
from the kinds of questions that are regarded
as the proper subjects of modern political philosophy, questions about liberty, obligation,
legitimacy, and so on. These questions are all
focused, in various ways, on the manner in
which the polity is constituted, rather than on
the goals or values of life styles which the
polity explicitly encourages or implicitly rewards. These latter considerations appear to lie
outside the perspective provided by the two
principal varieties of modern political philosophy discussed in this paper (,although they
form the major theme of ancient political philosophy). What we might describe as the shift
from the virtue paradigm to the legitimacy
paradigm appears to have been accompanied
by a severe narrowing of the range of questions which inform philosophic inquiry into the
political things.58 This narrowing, as I have
tried to suggest, may be distorting with respect
to our grasp of political reality, in confining
our attention to an insufficient, and perhaps
even occasionally unimportant, range of political phenomena. Now I want to be very clear
in indicating that I have in no way "refuted"
the legitimacy (or obligation) paradigm; I
have made no effort in this discussion to deal
with the epistemological, logical and moral is58 I

am using

"paradigm"

here only

for clarifica-

tion, and with almost the same meaning that I wish
to convey by the word "language." Paradigm refers
to the heart or grammar of the language, the rules
for the proper ordering of concepts and vocabulary,
the element that gives the language its particular
character and structure. This usage is like the one
established by Thomas S. Kuhn in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1962), chap. 5; however, I do not share, and
the use of "paradigm" here should not be taken to
imply, Kuhn's relativist assertion of the incommensurability of competing paradigms. The case for considering the history of political ideas in terms of
paradigms is presented by Bhiku Parekh and R. N.
Berki, "The History of Political Ideas: A Critique
of Q. Skinner's Methodology," Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (April, 1973), 163-184, and by
W. H. Greenleaf, "Hume, Burke and the General
Will," Political Studies, 20 (1972), 131-140, especially 139-140.
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sues which are involved in the question of the
justifiability of the paradigm change.59 What I
have tried to do is to suggest that there are
serious objections which can be made to the
necessary products or consequences of the legitimacy paradigm, and that these objections provide sufficient warrant to examine the possibilities of another approach to the problem of
understanding and evaluating political relationships. That alternative approach is one which
formulates the problem of the best human life
in terms of the problem of intellectual and
moral virtue.60
these
59 Leo Strauss's controversial discussions of
issues are of continuing importance. Relevant here
are the Introduction to The City and Man, Strauss's
"Epilogue" to Essays on the Scientific Study of
Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1962), and his essays
"What Is Political Philosophy" and "On Classical
Political Philosophy," reprinted in Strauss, What Is
Political Philosophy? (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).
The strongest and broadest defense of the modern
understanding of political philosophy is still Karl
Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London:
Routledge, 1945), Vol. I. An interesting discussion
and criticism of some of the central features of the
modern paradigm is provided by Bruce Aune, "The
Paradox of Empiricism," Metaphilosophy, 1 (April,
1970), 128-138. An interesting consideration of the
theoretical alternatives underlying the alternative conceptions of morals and politics is presented by Kenneth Dorter, "First Philosophy: Metaphysics or
Epistemology?," Dialogue 11 (March, 1972), 1-22.
60 The importance and interest of Rousseau for a
study of the strengths and limits of the two conceptions of politics discussed here can hardly be
overemphasized. Rousseau's treatment of politics in
the Social Contract and elsewhere presents one of
the best known uses of the legitimacy paradigm,
"community" variation. And yet Rousseau also insists, in a way that other legitimacy theorists (like
Hobbes and Locke) do not, on the intimate connection of (a kind of) virtue and politics. Moreover, no reader of Rousseau can avoid being impressed by the depth, complexity, and even by the
uncertainty, of his concern with the question of the
best life. Unlike almost any other modern writer,
Rousseau was led by this concern to consider not
only the question of the best political life, but also
that of the best alternatives to politics or citizenship,
thereby compelling his readers to engage in the process of comparing political virtue with nonpolitical
virtue or virtues. In the terms of this analysis, Rousseau holds a unique position as an uncommonly brilliant (though not necessarily successful) link between the language of legitimacy and obligation on
the one hand and the language of virtue on the
other.

